Η Ουκρανία, τα Γερμανικά Stiftungs, οι Γερμανορωσικές σχέσεις, η "Ευρώπη" και plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

Και, επαναλαμβάνω, η παραπάνω φωτό δεν είναι από το άρθρο του Stratfor (το οποίο παραθέτω στο τέλος). Είναι από το Did Hitler or Stalin Kill More Ukrainians in World War II? όπου η τελευταία πρόταση λέει: Today all over independent Ukraine there are discoveries of mass murder graves in the suburbs of cities (such as Bykivna in Kiev), and near all the KGB (NKVD) secret police stations throughout Ukraine. The Ukrainian victims of Stalin's Soviet Russia number in the millions. Many Ukrainians are also buried in the mass graves of Siberia. It is unknown how many of these Ukrainian victims of the Soviet system perished during the war years.

Δεν σάς ζητώ να πάρετε θέση στο θέμα. Ούτε αγνοώ ότι τι Stratfor είναι συνδρομητικό (δεν είναι τσάμπα) και αμερικανικό.  Και όσο αμερόληπτο θέλει ή δεν θέλει να είναι, είναι απόλυτα αναμενόμενο να έχει την προκατάληψη της χώρας του ή της γλώσσας του ή του ιδιοκτήτη του, ή των ...πελατών του. Μου είχε πει ένας δάσκαλός μου στο σχολείο, στο μάθημα της Ιστορίας, ότι όλοι, οι πάντες, τα πάντα, έχουν κάποια "προκατάληψη" (bias, στα αγγλικά).  Ο στοιχειωδώς σκεπτόμενος την λαμβάνει υπ' όψη, ή την φιλτράρει μέσα από την δική του προκατάληψη.  Οι Αμερικάνοι, οι Γερμανοί, οι Ρώσοι, οι πάντες έχουν την δική τους προκατάληψη. Μην είστε σίγουροι, όμως, εάν οι Ουκρανοί ή εμείς έχουμε δική μας, ελεύθερη, προκατάληψη... Δηλαδή έχουμε, αλλά άντε να την ...βρούμε.

Στο θέμα της Ουκρανίας, μην περιμένετε σαφή και αμερόληπτη άποψη...  Η Ουκρανία έχει ταραγμένο και δύσκολο παρελθόν.  Δείτε πχ εδώ (ιδίως μετά τον 14ο αιώνα),  εδώ, εδώ και εδώ, και όσο τα ψάχνετε θα δείτε τι ισχυρίζονται άλλοι ότι τους έχουν κάνει οι Ουκρανοί... Ατέλειωτες ιστορίες πραγματικά Ανρθωπογενούς μιζέριας...  Όλα με προκατάληψη, αλλά...   Η γεωγραφία δεν αλλάζει, αλλά η καημένη η Ουκρανία, όπως και οι άλλες χώρες μεταξύ τέως Αγίας Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας ή Αυστρο-Ουγγαρίας, ή Γερμανία, ή "Ευρώπης", από την μία και Ρωσίας από την άλλη είναι ένα ατέλειωτο μπρος πίσω που γίνεται πιο δυσνόητο με τις παμπάλαιες και ατέλειωτες μετακινήσεις πληθυσμών από ανατολικά προς δυτικά (δεν έχω δει ποτέ το αντίθετο...). Το που σταματάνε τα Δυτικά σύνορα της Ρωσίας είναι αντικείμενο πολέμων από πολύ πριν το 1700. Και η Ελληνική Επανάσταση, κάπως συνδέεται με αυτή την άσκηση... (Και περιπλέκεται περισσότερο λόγω της δικής μας γεωγραφίας, γειτονιάς, ζωτικού χώρου, και της θάλασσας που άλλοι ήθελαν για διέξοδο, άλλοι για πέρασμα).  Όλες μα όλες οι "ιδεολογίες" που έχουν εμφανιστεί εδώ, και που σας μπερδεύουν με δήθεν πολιτικές επιλογές έχουν σχέση με διελκυστίνδες, μεταξύ άλλων, τρίτων, και με την γεωγραφία μας. Ψάχνω να βρω την δική μας προκατάληψη, ψάχνω...

Το άρθρο του Strafor που ήταν αφορμή όλης αυτής της φλυαρίας:

German Involvement With the Ukrainian Opposition
December 12, 2013 | 0841 GMT

Summary

Germany has built relatively strong ties over the past years to one of the main Ukrainian opposition parties. But Berlin is aware of how sensitive Russia is to Western involvement in Ukraine. As protests in Kiev persist, Berlin's ties to Ukraine call into question the stability of the German-Russian relationship. Ultimately, Germany is likely to settle for a balance in Ukraine between East and West.

Analysis

German nongovernmental organizations and think tanks have long had programs in Ukraine supporting a wide range of projects. However, the recent protests that have swept Ukraine make the involvement of German political foundations promoting Ukraine's European integration much more significant

All the traditional German parties -- including the Christian Democratic Union, Social Democratic Party, the Christian Social Union, the Free Democratic Party, the Greens, and The Left -- have foundations that get funding from the German federal budget and work internationally [Stiftungs!]to strengthen ties to Germany, promote democracy and strengthen civil society. The two largest political foundations are the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (affiliated with the Social Democratic Party) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (affiliated with the Christian Democratic Union), which jointly receive around 250 million euros (around $345 million) annually from the federal government.

And while all the German political foundations have programs in Ukraine, the Konrad Adenauer foundation is the most active. It has the strongest ties to the Ukrainian opposition, particularly the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform led by Vitali Klitschko, members of which as recently as November participated in events organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Klitschko's German Ties

One of the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform's main goals is to integrate Ukraine more closely with Western Europe. This was evident in the party's opposition to Kiev's decision against signing the association agreement with the European Union and in its close links to other parties in Western Europe, particularly Germany's most popular party, the Christian Democratic Union led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Vitali Klitschko, who has led the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform since 2010, is one of the figures aiming to strengthen his popularity through the current protest movement.

Klitschko's strong ties to Germany mean Berlin's links into Ukrainian politics are likely the strongest of any European country. Klitschko moved to Germany in the late 1990s to advance his career as a boxer, speaks fluent German and was decorated by the German federal government in 2010 for his efforts to improve German-Ukrainian ties. He entered Ukrainian politics in 2006. His ties to Germany's political establishment became readily apparent after he founded the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform in 2010. These ties have likely helped establish his party and gain international attention for it

The Christian Democratic Union and Germany's past coalition government made no secret of their ties to Klitschko, while the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform lists the party as an official partner on its website. In early 2011, Klitschko visited Christian Democratic Union headquarters, where he met with a number of high-ranking party figures and learned the German party's inner workings. He also met with Merkel while attending the Christian Democratic Union party congress in December 2012 and has met with German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle, a member of the Free Democratic Party, on several occasions. The two most recently met during Westerwelle's visit to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe summit in Kiev, when they jointly visited protesters on the street. Shortly before that, Klitschko reportedly met with Merkel's foreign policy adviser, Christoph Heusgen, on the sidelines of the recent Eastern Partnership Summit.

Klitschko also receives attention outside Germany. He was recently invited to Paris by French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, though he cancelled the trip scheduled for Dec. 11 due to the ongoing protests in Kiev and instead spoke with Fabius by phone. According to a Dec. 8 report in Der Spiegel, Klitschko is also supposed to attend a mid-December meeting in Brussels for the leaders of the group of conservative parties in the European Parliament, among them Merkel's party. The group wants to use joint public appearances to further strengthen Klitschko as a counter to Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski has also publicly supported Klitschko, comparing him to Poland's first post-communist President and Nobel Peace prizewinner Lech Walesa.

Germany's Limits

While it is apparent that Germany has supported Klitschko's rise and position in Ukraine, it is unclear whether Berlin is actively facilitating the current crisis in Kiev or of it backs Klitschko's anti-Russian sentiments. Currently, Berlin's main focus is to stabilize the eurozone and the European Union, which are vital to Germany's economic well-being. While the financial aspect of the European crisis has somewhat stabilized, Europe's high unemployment and resulting deepening social and political crisis require most of its attention. Hence, despite the public attention given to the protests in Kiev, the current weakness of Germany and the European Union in general means they have little interest in persuading Kiev to seek closer integration with the West at the cost of worsening ties with Russia. Nor are Germany and European Union interested in offering billions in financial assistance up front as Ukraine requested, especially given that the economic cost of alienating Russia would be tremendous.

Ties to the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform also only afford Berlin limited influence into Ukraine's political scene and current protest movement. To sustain the pressure on Yanukovich, the Ukrainian protest movement has to develop a clear leadership that has the legitimacy to negotiate on the protesters' behalf. Klitschko is therefore just one of the leadership figures, though he is currently the most popular. Moreover, many of the protesters are motivated by general anger over the current government and are less focused on the agenda of closer EU integration.

Despite being Ukraine's fourth-largest party, the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform is still relatively small. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, it won just 40 out of 450 seats in parliament (two independent members of parliament have joined it since then). Its voter base is concentrated in Kiev and certain western regions but is weak in the country's east. But Klitschko's popularity is on the rise, so if elections were held now -- presidential elections are scheduled for January 2015 -- the party could be a force for the current regime to fear.

While Klitschko's calls for closer integration with Europe gain a lot of attention in the Western media, his position in the more Russo-friendly east remains weak. Over the past months, Moscow has shown that its position as an important economic partner for Kiev is a potent tool to limit Ukraine's ties with the West. It will likely use this tool again ahead of Ukraine's presidential elections. And Klitschko's ties to Germany could prove to be a hindrance, since many Ukrainians are wary of the Germans, and Russia and other Ukrainian political parties will likely find it easy to portray Klitschko as a foreign puppet.

Moreover, Germany's new government probably has not formulated a strategy regarding Ukraine. While Merkel's party has been the main one seeking political ties with the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform, any interference in Ukraine will have to be weighed against its negative impact on German relations with Russia. The Christian Democratic Union's main coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, prefers favorable ties with Russia and will likely argue against interfering too much in Ukraine.

As Russia gains greater influence in Eastern and Central Europe because of the structural weakness of the European Union, it is in more of a position to challenge Germany's effort to ensure EU cohesion. Even if limited, Germany's political influence in Ukraine can be viewed as a counter to the Russian threat and as leverage in negotiations with Russia. Ultimately, Berlin will not commit the same resources to Ukraine as will Moscow, and it will not seek to reorient Ukraine toward Europe. More likely, it will try to ensure that Ukraine maintains its balance between Europe and Russia. If it does, souring Russian and German relations will ripple across energy and trade relations -- and through countries between them.

Ξαναλέω: H φωτό στην ανάρτησή μου ΔΕΝ είναι του Stratfor. Ειναι δική μου ...προκατάληψη. Το άρθρο έχει ενδιαφέρον για το ποιος "εργάζεται" στην Ουκρανία, τα Γερμανικά Stiftung (!) ποιοί προφανως θέλουν τι, και πως τα Γερμανικά κόμματα δεν συμφωνούν στο θέμα, και τι σημασία έχει αυτό και για την Ευρωπαϊκή συνοχή. Εμεις, προφανώς είμαστε δεμένοι χεροπόδαρα, γιατί όπως έχω βαρεθεί να λέω δεν υπάρχει ΞΕΝΟΣ με σοβαρό κινητρο εδώ, ΠΕΡΑΝ ΤΟΥ ΑΝΤΙΠΕΡΙΣΠΑΣΜΟΥ ΟΚ?