Το STRATFOR δεν με έχει συνηθίσει σε τέτοια γλώσσα. Από το 2010 που κατάλαβα τι γίνεται, λέω ότι οι Γερμανοί, γνωστοί και σαν "Ευρωπαίοι", ή "πιστωτές", ή "θεσμοί", μας έχουν βάλει σε "εκκαθάριση εν λειτουργία". Αυτό δεν έγινε τυχαία... Ούτε σε μία νύχτα. Ούτε είμαστε αμέτοχοι. Πείτε το αντίδραση στην Χούντα, πείτε το ότι θέλετε, αλλά από την στιγμή που γύρισε ο "Εθνάρχης" από τις διακοπές του στην Γαλλία, από την στιγμή που ο Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου αποφάσισε να γίνει λαοπρόβλητος με δανεικά και κλεψιμαίϊκα, από την στιγμή που ξεριζώσαμε τα αμπέλια μας και σπάσαμε τα καΐκια μας για να πάρουμε τα πακέτα Ντελόρ, από την στιγμή που φτιάχτηκε η κάστα των ολιγαρχών με ελεγχόμενη "ελεύθερη τηλεόραση", το παιχνίδι χάθηκε. Ο ανιψιός του "Εθνάρχη" είχε μία ευκαιρία, με τα Δεκεμβριανά του 2008 να κόψει τον Γόρδιο Δεσμό. Το ίδιο, και ο να μην πω, Γιωργάκης, το 2010. Ο Γόρδιος Δεσμός είναι ότι χρωστάμε μη εξυπηρετήσιμα δάνεια, σε σκληρό νόμισμα που ελέγχουν αυτοί που λάδωναν για να δανειζόμαστε, και τοποθετούσαν Κυβερνήσεις που δεν θα τολμούσαν, ή δεν θα μπορούσαν, να κάνουν κάτι για αυτό. Ένα, θανάσιμο λάθος, έχει υπάρξει η αδυναμία, από το 2008; Το 2001; Να πούμε στον εαυτό μας την αλήθεια και να εξαρτώμεθα από δική μας ρευστότητα. Σκληρό, δύσκολο, πολύ δύσκολο. Αλλά, πιο εύκολο το 2001 από το 2008, από το 2010, από το 2012, από τώρα. Αλλά όταν την αλήθεια την ελέγχουν αυτοί που μας δανείζουν, μέσα από τα ανθρωπάκια που παριστάνουν την ελίτ, βράσε ρύζι...
Τώρα, το STRATFOR μιλάει για πολιορκία, και εξάντληση και πόλεμο που δεν έχει τελειώσει. Εκκαθάριση εν λειτουργία λέγεται, μόνο που είμαστε εδώ που είμαστε, και η Ελλάδα ...ποτέ δεν πεθαίνει (αλλά δεν ορκίζομαι κιόλας, με τόσα λαμόγια που κυκλοφορούν και μιλάνε Ελληνικά).
THE SIEGE OF GREECE NEARS ITS NEXT BREAKING POINT
The
five key decision-makers on the creditor side of the Greek crisis convened in
Berlin for an emergency meeting the night of June 1 that brings to
mind a gathering of generals the night before a major assault. Together, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Francois Hollande, European Central
Bank President Mario Draghi, International Monetary Fund chief Christine
Lagarde and European Commission head Jean-Claude Juncker thrashed out the terms of a Greek surrender that would suit them all. Meanwhile the
Greek defenders prepared terms of their own, with Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras
calling a Cabinet meeting of his most senior advisers.
The siege has been ongoing for months. Since February, Europe's creditors have been camped outside Greece's walls, allowing only a minimal flow of resources into the country in the shape of the European Central Bank's emergency liquidity assistance, which Greece's tottering banks rely on for survival. Regular meetings of the central bank's board have seen increasingly lengthy discussions on reducing the value of the collateral used by Greece's banks to access the liquidity, surely a tactic to make those within the walls quiver with fear.
Meanwhile, behind their battlements the Greeks have been slowly exhausting their resources. One condition of continuing assistance funding is that the Greeks continue paying their debts, and these costs, alongside the basic costs of paying wages and pensions, have seen Greece's already meager funds diminish by the week. Many within the country have lost faith in ultimate victory, moving their capital out of Greek banks and into other countries, fearful of the repercussions of defeat. This slow, constrictive deprivation of resources is one of the oldest strategies ever devised, and the Europeans have been using it to try to make the Greeks more amenable.
The Greeks, for their part, have been pursuing a classic strategy of the besieged. When facing a great force made up of several separate armies camped outside one's battlements, the wise course is to sew discord among them. Back in February, the first battle won by Greece's chief mischief-maker, Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, was the dropping of the name "Troika" — the collective moniker that represented the combined force of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF; these were henceforth to be known as "the institutions." At the time, the change in terminology seemed cosmetic and unimportant. Since February, however, the divisions between the three players have widened dramatically.
The ECB, no doubt keeping an eye on a European Court of Justice ruling due June 16 that is likely to demand that the central bank be less involved politically, has been trying to remove itself from any decision-making role. The IMF, which has committed much more capital to Greek bailouts than it has ever done with any other country, has been wondering loudly whether it wants to remain involved in the Greek issue. The European Commission, meanwhile, which essentially just wants everyone to get along, has been exposed as a facilitator with little actual clout, suggesting various plans that have largely been ignored by the other players. Thus, the European countries — arguably the engines driving the whole campaign — have found that their shock troops have become by turns disinterested, unmotivated and ineffectual. The besiegers' front now looks considerably less united.
But the time has now come for the conflict to be settled — or at least extended under new terms. Both sides know that the status quo cannot last beyond June 30, when the bailout expires. Greece faces giant debt repayments in July and August that, considering its current emaciated state, it has no chance of paying. Moreover, the Greek banks' supply of collateral is projected to dry up around the end of June, meaning the limits of the emergency liquidity assistance program may be reached even without an ECB decision. For the Greek leaders, an outright rebellion is not an option, since most Greeks would like to stay in the eurozone. The European side would also prefer to avoid bloodshed: A Greek exit from Europe could do more damage to the European side than Greece's small size might suggest.
So the two sides each met for one last council of war, in preparation for the coming peace negotiations. The most likely result is a temporary negotiated extension. The Greek side appears to have crossed one of its "red lines" by agreeing to some negotiation around pension reforms. But the two combatants remain far apart on key issues such as labor reform and a mutually compatible primary budget surplus target. In addition, Greek leaders may wish for more time to prepare rebellious factions within the ruling Syriza party for an ultimate accommodation. An agreement that involves the besiegers granting some capital to help the besieged pay their way, in exchange for further reforms from the Greek side, would prepare the ground for a more substantial peace treaty this fall, when a third bailout could be negotiated.
If a deal cannot be struck under these civilized terms, the conflict could turn ugly. The creditors have the power to cut off assistance funding, bringing about a collapse of the Greek banking system, the implementation of capital controls, and likely the ultimate submission of the Greek state. Whether things are settled the easy way or the hard way, any agreement is unlikely to last long. The forces that fueled Syriza's resistance in the first place — the creditors' austerity policies — will likely take a dominant role in the final settlement terms. This battle will come to an end with both sides no doubt claiming victory, as is often the case. But in reality, the war will still be far from over
The siege has been ongoing for months. Since February, Europe's creditors have been camped outside Greece's walls, allowing only a minimal flow of resources into the country in the shape of the European Central Bank's emergency liquidity assistance, which Greece's tottering banks rely on for survival. Regular meetings of the central bank's board have seen increasingly lengthy discussions on reducing the value of the collateral used by Greece's banks to access the liquidity, surely a tactic to make those within the walls quiver with fear.
Meanwhile, behind their battlements the Greeks have been slowly exhausting their resources. One condition of continuing assistance funding is that the Greeks continue paying their debts, and these costs, alongside the basic costs of paying wages and pensions, have seen Greece's already meager funds diminish by the week. Many within the country have lost faith in ultimate victory, moving their capital out of Greek banks and into other countries, fearful of the repercussions of defeat. This slow, constrictive deprivation of resources is one of the oldest strategies ever devised, and the Europeans have been using it to try to make the Greeks more amenable.
The Greeks, for their part, have been pursuing a classic strategy of the besieged. When facing a great force made up of several separate armies camped outside one's battlements, the wise course is to sew discord among them. Back in February, the first battle won by Greece's chief mischief-maker, Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis, was the dropping of the name "Troika" — the collective moniker that represented the combined force of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF; these were henceforth to be known as "the institutions." At the time, the change in terminology seemed cosmetic and unimportant. Since February, however, the divisions between the three players have widened dramatically.
The ECB, no doubt keeping an eye on a European Court of Justice ruling due June 16 that is likely to demand that the central bank be less involved politically, has been trying to remove itself from any decision-making role. The IMF, which has committed much more capital to Greek bailouts than it has ever done with any other country, has been wondering loudly whether it wants to remain involved in the Greek issue. The European Commission, meanwhile, which essentially just wants everyone to get along, has been exposed as a facilitator with little actual clout, suggesting various plans that have largely been ignored by the other players. Thus, the European countries — arguably the engines driving the whole campaign — have found that their shock troops have become by turns disinterested, unmotivated and ineffectual. The besiegers' front now looks considerably less united.
But the time has now come for the conflict to be settled — or at least extended under new terms. Both sides know that the status quo cannot last beyond June 30, when the bailout expires. Greece faces giant debt repayments in July and August that, considering its current emaciated state, it has no chance of paying. Moreover, the Greek banks' supply of collateral is projected to dry up around the end of June, meaning the limits of the emergency liquidity assistance program may be reached even without an ECB decision. For the Greek leaders, an outright rebellion is not an option, since most Greeks would like to stay in the eurozone. The European side would also prefer to avoid bloodshed: A Greek exit from Europe could do more damage to the European side than Greece's small size might suggest.
So the two sides each met for one last council of war, in preparation for the coming peace negotiations. The most likely result is a temporary negotiated extension. The Greek side appears to have crossed one of its "red lines" by agreeing to some negotiation around pension reforms. But the two combatants remain far apart on key issues such as labor reform and a mutually compatible primary budget surplus target. In addition, Greek leaders may wish for more time to prepare rebellious factions within the ruling Syriza party for an ultimate accommodation. An agreement that involves the besiegers granting some capital to help the besieged pay their way, in exchange for further reforms from the Greek side, would prepare the ground for a more substantial peace treaty this fall, when a third bailout could be negotiated.
If a deal cannot be struck under these civilized terms, the conflict could turn ugly. The creditors have the power to cut off assistance funding, bringing about a collapse of the Greek banking system, the implementation of capital controls, and likely the ultimate submission of the Greek state. Whether things are settled the easy way or the hard way, any agreement is unlikely to last long. The forces that fueled Syriza's resistance in the first place — the creditors' austerity policies — will likely take a dominant role in the final settlement terms. This battle will come to an end with both sides no doubt claiming victory, as is often the case. But in reality, the war will still be far from over
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