Χαζεύω τις Αμερικανικές ιστοσελίδες, και αυτό που βλέπω είναι ότι υπάρχει αμφισβήτηση, αντίδραση, παραινέσεις, διαφωνίες με ό,τι πάει ή δεν πάει να γίνει. Παρ' όλα αυτά ακόμα και οι πιο αντι-Ομπαμικοί, ή οι πιο απαθείς θα συσπειρωθούν πίσω από τον Commander-in-Chief, και την Χώρα τους εάν και όταν έρθει η ώρα. Αυτό είναι αυτό που κάνει τις ΗΠΑ λίγο δυσνόητη γι εμάς. Συν το πραγματικά μπερδεμένο και αμφιλεγόμενο αυτής της κατάστασης στην Συρία.
Πόλεμο τον Επτά Ετών, και τον Ψυχρό), και λιγάκι ακούω βερεσέ τις θεωρίες περί κακού κεφαλαίου (χάλια είναι το κεφάλαιο, αλλά για δείτε παρακαλώ πιο κεφάλαιο απ' όλα σας ενοχλεί... το κληρονομικό, βασιλικό, κεφάλαιο, ή αυτό του ελεύθερου εμπορίου και των πειρατών; Εγώ είμαι με τους πειρατές και το ελεύθερο εμπόριο, και όχι τους κληρονομικούς φεουδάρχες), στον Α' ΠΠ και τον Β' ΠΠ μάλλον με το ζόρι και με πολλή προσπάθεια από "Ευρωπαίους" μπήκαν στον χορό οι ΗΠΑ. Το Βιετνάμ ήταν Γαλλικά σκατά. Η Λιβύη Ιταλικά, ή Αγγλικά. Η Μέση Ανατολή Αγγλο-Γερμανικός καυγάς με ενδιαφερόμενο μπαλαντέρ την Ρωσία. Και φυσικά, η Μέση Ανατολή, και τα Βαλκάνια, στην πλάτη της Τουρκίας σαν γεωπολιτικού συνεχιστή της Ανατολικής Ρωμαϊκής Αυτοκρατορίας, και συγγνώμη εάν αυτό είναι ανορθόδοξο -- αλλά ξεχάστε το παραμύθι και τους μετακινούμενους λαούς, και τις θρησκείες, δείτε την Γεωγραφία. Η Ανατολική Ρωμαϊκή Αυτοκρατορία, σαν Γεωγραφικός χώρος, ενόχλησε και ενοχλεί κυρίως την ...Δυτική.
για την κρίση του Σουέζ... Είναι πριν το τέλος του Ψυχρού, πριν τους δύο πολέμους του Ισραήλ, αλλά ίδιο σκηνικό (και σίγουρα ίδια Γεωγραφία). Οι "Ευρωπαίοι" έχουν την ατζέντα τους, οι Δυτικοί και οι Ανατολικοί την δική τους και ήμουν νιος και γέρασα, και plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose, απλά δεν ξέρω εγώ την ατζέντα. Αυτή την φορά, οι διαφορετικές "απόψεις" Ιρανών, Σαουδαράβων και Τούρκων (άσε πια το Ισραήλ) κάπως είναι στην ατζέντα.
Δείτε, αν αντέχετε, και το τελευταίο του Stratfor (η όποια έμφαση, δική μου):
The U.S. administration appears to be going out of its way to leak to news outlets the details of an impending operation in Syria. This should be seen as a form of dialogue between the government and a war-weary American public. The message behind the leaks is that the United States intends to carry out a limited punitive strike -- one in which some, but not all, high-value targets, including command and control facilities and delivery systems, will come under a barrage of Tomahawk cruise missiles and other guided missiles in an operation lasting less than a week.
The emphasis on a short operation is primarily intended to assuage the concerns of many Americans still skeptical of the need to militarily intervene in the Middle East for the third time in a decade. Though it won't be said outright in a press release, the United States has little interest in delivering a deadly blow to the regime. If the United States breaks the regime, it will have a hard time dodging the cleanup, especially when jihadists operating in a weapons-rich environment will exploit the power vacuum in Damascus.
Instead, the primary intent behind a limited strike will be to deliver a message that Washington hopes will resonate well beyond Syrian borders: Ignoring U.S. ultimatums will carry consequence. U.S. President Barack Obama put U.S. credibility on the line when he declared the use of chemical weapons as his red line for action, and so action will follow.
But the type and timing of the action will also greatly affect the credibility of the message. The widely telegraphed limited strike plan for Syria is already conjuring up negative comparisons to Clinton's 1998 cruise missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan that evidently did nothing to weaken al Qaeda, as well as Operation Desert Fox launched the same year to "degrade," not eliminate, Iraq's ability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. This could well be another symbolic, albeit ineffective, foreign policy decision to demonstrate that the United States is doing something, even if that something isn't much of anything.
Already struggling to convince the American public that the Syrian regime's chemical attack deserves a military response, the president is also being challenged by his own schedule. Obama is set to leave Sept. 3 for Sweden, from which he will travel to Russia for the Sept. 5-6 G-20 summit. Unnamed White House officials talking to the press have speculated that Obama would like to have the operation wrapped up before he takes the trip, which is what has fueled rumors that the operation could begin as early as Thursday nightfall.
The U.S. military already has the assets in place for a limited strike, but the legal path to the strike is still bumpy. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon is insisting that the United Nations be given the time -- at least four days -- to complete its investigation of the attack. The United States has been trying to convince the public that it has the evidence it needs to justify an attack and that the investigation itself is inconsequential. Russia has been condemning the United States for seemingly rushing into action without evidence and said that it will not consider a resolution in the U.N. Security Council until it sees the U.N. report on the attack. Even the United Kingdom, which introduced a resolution to the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday authorizing "necessary measures to protect civilians" in Syria and which would be playing a significant role in the operation itself, is now saying that it, too, would like to see the results of the investigation before taking action. Whether the delivery of the U.N. report can be accelerated is unclear at this point.
The United States does not necessarily want to invite criticism for taking a legal shortcut to military action, particularly when the United Kingdom is now assuming a more cautious legal stance in demanding a review of the investigation before a strike. At the same time, the U.S. administration has to worry about building, not to mention maintaining, public momentum for a military response to a chemical weapons attack that occurred a week ago. Unless further provocations by the Syrian regime are made, as days pass Obama's struggle to build his case will grow.
The additional time could still be put to good use, however. The United States will try to use any extra time to build up coalition participation in an attack, though critical players like Turkey and Jordan that are highly prone to retaliation are already exhibiting signs of reluctance about getting more deeply involved. Most important, the United States will try to use any additional time to try to force a diplomatic solution that would have the ideal outcome of extricating Syrian President Bashar al Assad and avoiding a strike altogether.
For this ambitious outcome, the United States needs Russia. The Russians have a substantial intelligence footprint in Syria and relationships with the al Assad regime. Russia would thus be Syria's primary diplomatic patron to help orchestrate an exit strategy for the Syrian president. Such an arrangement could still keep the military and intelligence apparatus intact and thus avoid creating a power vacuum in Damascus. Russia would also be able to preserve its influence in a post-al Assad regime, and the United States theoretically would be able to avoid another messy military entanglement in the Middle East. But the Russians would exact a high price for such a diplomatic bargain, and it's not clear that a politically acceptable exit for al Assad would be possible. Al Assad would have a hard time trusting a negotiation knowing that he could be tried for war crimes. Instead, a more creative solution may be sought that aims at facilitating an Alawite coup against al Assad, but even that strategy comes with its share of obstacles.
The United States would need to pull back from the perception of a limited strike to telegraphing a much more devastating military campaign to influence al Assad to bend to an ultimatum. More military assets would also have to be moved into theater to try to bluff such an operation. This would come at the cost of upsetting the already carefully orchestrated public relations campaign the administration has been pursuing to convince the American public that its military response will be brief and limited in scope. The leaks so far may seem like they have all the answers of how and when the strike will take place, but there are still a number of constraints on all players that will ultimately shape this operation.